As the ITLOS had been called to pass judgment only on the competence of jurisdiction (so if it was up to India or to Italy the right to strike up a criminal case on the facts of 15.02.2012) there was no reason for either of the parties to act with statements of guilt or innocence against the two accused from India, M. Latorre and S. Girone.
But while the Italian side has been followed in this concept, from the Indian side the contrary has happened and representatives of India have repeatedly proclaimed the guilt of the two accused as if this has already been proven in a criminal trial that not even India has ever started.
Even before the ITLOS began hearings reports of the various representatives of the parties involved, India has filed a written document which describes the events and claims to take for sure the guilt of the two Italian soldiers for the death of two fishermen.
to Written observations of the Republic of India, 6 August 2015 - Volume 1
This document is accompanied by a long list of "Attachments" (Annex) from no. 1 at number 56, and from experience I believe that in court the claims are worth very little if they are not supported by testable items of evidence, and that these items of evidence are usually just in the annexes explicitly called to support the proclamation of guilt or innocence.
I also believe that this "proclamation of guilt" continuously repeated in writing and voice could have influenced the judges in their final decision. Nobody expected that in the face of the judgment that admits the dispute to international arbitration, which enjoin Italy and India to suspend the judicial orders and see the ultimate solution of the dispute to the Hague Tribunal, it would later let the two accused deprived of their liberty in India, and thus still under the Indian Penal jurisdiction. It seems nonsense.
I also read that the ITLOS enjoined both parties Italy and India to submit within 24 September a summary document on the case which will become an "official act" both at the ITLOS and at the Hague Tribunal.
It’s obvious that while the Indian side will continue to proclaim the guilt of Latorre and Girone by written documents supported by 56 Annexes, and from the Italian side it is not contested that it is by then a fact designed by India and not rejected by the ITLOS, this will negatively affect the perception that judges will have of the story, appearing a tacit admission of guilt, and will affect at the expense of Italy both ITLOS judges and the next in the Hague, that will not have another point of reference different from the Indian version and will be led to believe that there are no arguments of dispute.
As for more than three years I have been following both each other on all open sources available and I have gained a thorough understanding of some by no means marginal technical and reconstructive aspects, and because I was never able to have access to documents of Indian investigation, I decided to request them from ITLOS according to the principle that every document that comes into a court of law has to be public, unless there are legal reasons to deny it.
I did not request "all" the 56 attachments, but only those that relate to the technical and reconstruction of the events, which falls within my several decades of competencies as "Court Expert".
The ITLOS after a few hours from the request made by e-mail replied positively by sending all the requirements except two documents deemed "confidential" (Annex 1).
Mail from ITLOS
I thus came into possession, by permission of ITLOS and with no restrictions on the use, of the Indian official documents by which it is intended to support at the same ITLOS the claims of Italian guilt declared in writing and verbally.
The defense exercises a right and
fulfills a duty highlighting gaps,
omissions, contradictions and anything else of the accusatory plant, recalling that in the Court the
prosecution must provide "certainties",
not least of all hypotheses and conjectures.
From reading the ITLOS
a circumstance until
but for which we must necessarily take into account during the analysis:
in ANNEX 29 - Statement of Mr Sahil Gupta, Crew member of the MV Enrica Lexie, 26 June 2013:
"Ship time is 30 minutes behind IST" (Pag. 4 last line)
in ANNEX 33 - Statement of Mr Victor James Mandley Samson, Crew member of the MV Enrica Lexie, 24 July 2013:
"The ship time is 30 minutes behind Indian Standard Time" (Pag. 4 line 9)
On the Enrica Lexie watches do not mark the local India time ( +5:30) that it has adopted a time zone which, but that universally considered standard to the longitude (TIME ZONE E (echo) + 5:00). Therefore, in preparing the timing of certain events schedules must be reviewed, moving them back 30 minutes. This occasion will be marked with the icon follows (Enrica Lexie Time - Ship Time).
Indian Coast Guard, diary of events, 2012
The diary of events made by the Indian Coast Guard (hereinafter ICG) concerning the “shooting from oil tanker Enrica Lexie” will be analyzed from the moment of the incident to the arrival of the Italian ship to the Kochi port where it was forced to drop anchor. I.e. all the phases of the incident before the Indian authorities burst on the ship.
The chronological reconstruction ICG made in ANNEX 1 gives a dramatic picture of events:
by considering as true the version where Enrica Lexie (hereinafter Lexie) left without launching the alert, thus not fulfilling its obligations: the escape;
by exalting the technological – investigative efficiency which resulted in identifying the offenders: the “chase”;
finally, by describing the efficiency of aero-naval operation without which they could not succeed in bringing the offenders to justice: the “capture”.
Escape, chase and capture. Three parts of a tale I will demonstrate to be false. Once again, a prejudice from Coast Guard, which through a series of omissions reported facts very different from what happened, has to be outlined.
As for the report sent by the Lexie Captain, Umberto Vitelli (later confirmed to investigators: see ANNEX 27), he launched the SSAS (Ship Security Alert System) Alert immediately after they heard shots and he had ordered the crew to take shelter (...this is not a drill, and everyone proceed to Engine Control Room we are under pirate attack...). This alert automatically and in real time sends main data of event to Italian national authorities and to the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) competent in that area: the IMRCC (the Indian Coast Guard’s one. having its headquarter in Mumbai).
[Report sent from the Lexie’s Captain to the ship owner and to anti-piracy organizations (MSCHOA-UKMTO)]
Vitelli himself gives the first evidence that the alert was effectively launched when he communicates he was contacted from the warship “Grecale”, the Italian missile frigate that, within the anti-piracy OTAN mission “Ocean Shield”, was in the Aden Gulf at 992 nautical miles (hereinafter Nm) distant from Lexie (more than 1,800 Km). Too far to intervene.
(source: Navy Press Office in L'Unità of 2 April 2013)
The SSAS alert message exists and it is recorded in the Tribunal archives (ANNEX A3)
[The message automatically generated from Lexie SSAS]
Indian claim according which they did not receive the SSAS alert would mean that the entire Indian system responsible for rescue and reception of alert messages was off duty. Not only the land bases, but even military ships at anchor or sailing.
Military and police installations in the Kerala coast in front of the accidentA very serious fact is that a rescue request was received by everyone except by those who had to receive it or, worst, it was received but ignored so that they did not intervene.
Considering the facts, we can just outline that SSAS alert launched by Lexie at 11.23 should have been the first one chronologically reported by ICG in ANNEX 1, but it is not.
This is a serious omission, which completely changes the framework and causes an irremediable damage against men who were on board of Lexie: i.e. to be escaped without informing Indian authorities. A blameworthy lie. Nothing could be more false.
At 17:40 the Neendakara Coastal Police Station (hereinafter CPS) contacts the IMRCC. The police of the small harbour where St.Antony dropped anchor reports that: "A merchant ship fired against the fishing vessel St.Antony causing the death of two fishermen " [ 1 ] also giving all data received by St.Antony until that moment (CPS defined them, in its report (ANNEX 3): "cryptic information regarding this incident), data necessary to the ICG to start the search.
Indications as: name of ship (Enrica Lexie), nationality of flag (Italy), typology (oil tanker), a summary description (black and red), place and time of incident (16:30, 20.5Nm from the coast of Allepey), direction and speed (330°, 13-14 kts.).
If the data that Neendakara gave to IMRCC were similar to these, the official on duty who received Lexie SSAS alert at least forty - five minutes before (alert which reports time and position of incident, route and speed of Italian ship) would have immediately incited the whole ICG to chase the Lexie. On the contrary, the initial search is for a generic “suspect vessel” [ 3 ] and lasts an hour and a half.
What indication Neendakara, and then Mumbai, received by St.Antony, or in other words what and where ICG was searching is not clear. It is possible to deduce it from the report drafted by the pilot of the Dornier CG760 reconnaissance aircraft (ANNEX A7) who received mission instructions when he was on airstrip waiting for take-off order.
Le istruzioni di missione fornite al pilota del ricognitore
The pilot writes: "I was to carry out the search of a suspect vessel between Kollam and Kodungallur". No other indication: nothing about oil tanker, nothing about black and red ship, nothing about northern or southern direction. Nothing.
The aircraft did not take off and continued waiting in the airstrip, while the ICGS Samar headed "at full speed" toward the place of incident, at that point deserted.
However, things did not go exactly in this way. The military report drafted after the irruption on the Lexie (ANNEX A9) describes more exhaustively how ICG came to identification:
[How ICG came to identification of Lexie]Actually, the AIS-SB analysis, supposing that initial data were correct, narrowed down the search to four compatible targets, four ships from which shots could have been fired against the fishing vessel (St. Antony incident) PAY ATTENTION NOW: as only one of these four ships informed the competent anti-piracy authorities to have fired (Lexie incident) ... then they are the offenders.
ICG proceeded by excluding categorically that ships from which shots came that afternoon could not be more than one. The reason still escapes us. We will understand it when they will be called before the judges during the trial.
Four suspected, one guilty.
Every trace of the other three "compatible” ships is lost. As regards this analysis and what was produced in tribunal, they were not even consulted, thus defying any control. In that period names of some ships (Kamome Victoria, Ocean Breeze, MBA Giovanni) were published on Indian press, however when we tried to have some evidence, it emerged that no one of them could be connected to the crime scene because of direction, position and time.
Instead, we are sure that in the research area – as defined by the pilot – there was at least another black and red oil tanker (Olympic Fair), which – some hours later - will denounce an attempted boarding as well. However, due the unreliability of documents given by ICG, where who is supposed to be there is not and who was there is not supposed to be, we cannot exclude there were other ships, maybe many others..
The issue of AIS
There is a serious doubt about the identification by using AIS tracks. They talked about anti-collision AIS system during the days immediately following the incident, when someone noted that, after being seen close to Sri Lanka at 13:51 of 14 February, Lexie disappeared from AIS tracks.
[The last AIS position of Lexie before the incident]
It is a standard practice to turn off the AIS in order to not be identified by pirates while approaching the HRA (the piracy High Risk Area, which includes the western Indian coasts).
[Lexie path through the High Risk Area]
In the Lexie logbook (ANNEX A14) there is evidence about what effectively happened.
At 18:00 of 14 February Captain Vitelli writes down to have given the instructions required for navigation through HRA. Reinforced the vigilance, enabled the precautions.
As far as we are enabled to understand, and unless otherwise proved, Lexies sails with its AIS device turned off, since it left Sri Lanka.
There is another event in ANNEX 1 which ICG 'forgets' to note down:
At about 19:00 shortly before announcing to the whole wide world that it had identified the ‘suspect ship’, IMRCC contacted the Lexie via INMARSAT and this fact is mentioned by various documents (ANNEX 27) (A9) (A14) but not by ANNEX 1.
Here is how this call was recorded in the Lexie’s Log Book by Commander Vitelli.
[Lexie’s Log Book – 15th February 2012 - Times ]
As shown above Vitelli writes on the matter: "Bombay MRCC ….. told us that they had been informed about the suspect pirate attack and, as a result, had seized two crafts meaning the SSAS alert had reached the ICG - "Having enquired about our course and speed" – that means this data was neither visible nor traced by the AIS-SB system - "they asked me to change course and head towards Cochin (India) to take stock of events and bear witness" – this is a lie, a deception, false information or, as stated to the Press by the Inspector General S.P.S. Basra, Coast Guard Regional Commander (West): .... the Coast Guard had employed an INGENIOUS ‘TACTIC' (from The Hindu 18th February 2012) to which Vitelli merely made a simple request - "I requested and received a written request" – which reached him shortly afterwards by e-mail.
When it reached Kochi, as requested by ICG [ 10 ] the Lexie was directed by the Cochin Port Trust to an outer anchorage, 7nm offshore.
It dropped anchor at 22.18 monitored by ICGS Lakshmibai on patrol [ 11 ][the Lexie’s voyage is over.INS Kabra that sails at 19:30 [ 5 ] [the Dornier CG760 which takes off at 19:35 [ 6 ][ the Police that sends 4 officers on board ICGS Lakshmibai [ 7 ]7the reconnaissance vessel that sights the tanker and directs it to head for Kochi at 19:50 when the ship is already on its way there [ 8 ][ICGS Lakshmibai which sails with the Police on board (but will get in sight of the Lexie only at 21:30) [[ 9 ]. Do not let all that impress you, they are only Special Effects that the Indian Coast Guard thought fit to add to its tale. And that is not the end of it.
On the morning of that 16th of February, shortly before the ICG and Police (who sent 36 men) burst onto the ship, a fishing boat similar to the St Antony was brought under the beam of the Lexie.
Just the time needed to take some aerial pictures meant to show “the killer”, “the victim” and “the avenger”. It should be noted that both ships and the boat are static.
This picture was immediately released by the Coast Guard press office, copied and relayed by every newspaper and all the news sites of the world.
This photograph became the icon of "Italian guilt" in spite of the fact that the fishing boat had returned the evening before to its home harbour of Neendakara. Definitely something was wrong and not only the times reported...
ICG Press Office – News release dated 16.02.2012
The ANNEX 1 document seems marred by serious omissions and obvious contradictions with the only purpose of forming a prejudicial framework. So no escape, no hunt, no capture, but the naive attempt to credit an alleged Italian guilt, with MV Lexie fleeing into the Indian Ocean and the Coast Guard launching an aerial and naval operation to grab the tanker.
In practical terms the method used, to limit the search area and therefore identify the ship, is by no means convincing. The enquiry framework gives no reason why out of four suspects one only will be investigated.
There are serious omissions about the SSAS alert but also about the use of TACTICS by a Rescue Centre.
serious is that they endeavoured to find a fake for
the St Antony fishing boat to
achieve their aims, especially when one considers
that, since the preceding night, a clear contradiction
was apparent as to the time when the fishing boat was
shot at. This contradiction should have cautioned to
be more careful and abstain from proclaiming a
(Translator: Irene Piccolo)
First Information Statement of Mr. Freddy, 15 February 2012
ANNEX 2 concerns the first “recited” (oral) witness, and is made to the Police by Mr. Freddy Bosco, the master of the vessel to his return to the port of Neendakara.
The statement beginning
An image of the dramatic return of the "St. Anthony" in the port of Neendakara, in the box Mr Freddy Bosco
The landing is at around 11:00
PM ist, in presence of a large number of onlookers and
local media to which, getting down to the ground, Freddy
releases his declarations.
Spontaneous declarations made in front of microphones, cameras and witnesses, in the presence of a graduated police officer, and recorded by the VENAD News in a video re-released by the indian television network and published the following day on YOUTUBE.COM address
(from minute 2'05" to follow)
I had it translated from the Malayalam language, Bosco's language. The translation that later was repeated, verified and confirmed by countless individuals (journalists and TV stations which re-launched the news in July 2013).
The shooting against the fishing boat St. Antony took place, according to the master of the boat, about at 9:30 PM ist hours.
Note how, after Freddy Bosco said the shooting occurred at 9:30 PM ist, one of those present in the video asks "but did it not take place at 5:00 PM?" - Bosco repeats: "No, at PM" 9:30.”
The words with which he opens the accident reconstruction are exactly: "When it was around 9:30 PM I heard a huge noise ..."
The hot statements of Freddy Bosco made to the press in the presence of the Police
Statements by Freddy Bosco translated
English translation: seeninside.net/piracy/freddy-eng.flv
Italian translation (*): seeninside.net/piracy/freddy-ita.flv
(*) edited translation of the RAI (Italian Radio and Television), aired July 3, 2013
It would therefore be evident from the hot statements of Bosco, the main witness of the shooting, that the staff aboard the Enrica Lexie cannot be charged any responsibility for the double murder. The accident of the oil tanker takes place between 4:00 PM and 5:00 PM (see Latorre Report) and the shooting against the St. Antony at 9:30 PM
On July 2013, the Italian media revived the video content
At this point Freddy Bosco, who still knows nothing of the accident occurred to Enrica Lexie, went to the local police station to release its "FIR" (First Information Report - ANNEX 2); that same police station at 5:40 PM ist provided to the Coast Guard the details of the accident of the St. Antony getting all those relating to the accident of the Italian ship.
If the statements made to the press a few minutes before by the master of the vessel are confirmed someone in the Police station in Neendakara:
- should admit that he had missed the real culprits of the double murder, unable to stop the incidents involving, with increasing frequency, fishermen and merchant shipping;
but above all:
- Should explain under what: an oil tanker of more than 104,000 tons. that does not beat Indian flag and is sailing outside the territorial waters, its crew and even the military unit of a NATO country operating in the field of EUNAVFOR (under UN auspices) is located at that time in Kochi, at anchor under military custody.
Old readings, marginal and some without feedback, but useful for better understanding of the background and the state of Freddy Bosco mood when he went to the police:
- At the time of the accident the conduct of the boat was entrusted to Jelestine (one of the victims) that had no "license" (editor's note: boat license); and the crew member who had it, was sleeping. (Rohit Raj on Deccan Chronicle of April 28, 2012);
- The St. Antony fishing boat registered in India is authorized to operate only within the territorial waters, within 12 nautical miles (Samir Saran of The Hindu of July 2, 2012);
- Registered in Tamil Nadu (editor's note: where Bosco is resident) under local fisheries law and not on the national nautical registers (under the Shipping Act of 1958), to St.Antony would not be allowed to navigate out of the territorial waters of the Indian Union State in which it was registered (in SUPREME COURT oF INDIA - SLP (C) NO. 20370 of 2012 - para 29)
Annex 2 – passage No2 (time and position)
It is disturbing that:
- The testimony by Bosco made in the presence of a graduated police officer, in front of dozens of people is not reflected in the Indian judicial documentation.
- The same Bosco in later years will never mention this witness, insisting several times with statements to the press that the shooting against the St. Antony took place at 4:30 PM , except then, facing clear evidence, candidly admitting on July 2013 ANSA: he had said yes PM 9:30 , but cannot explain why.
We are facing a blatant concealment of exculpatory evidence of the two accused, concealment made by Bosco and by the State Police of Kerala which operating as a state institution invested with the judicial police function, is mandated to provide all the information in its possession to the judiciary, keeping the facts in a detached position and "impartial".But from the statement, though false or misleading, may come other investigative insights to reconstruct the events.
In passage No.2, that I've
already shown you, as well as setting the time, Bosco has given us a first indication of the area where the incident took place ("At 4:30 PM we arrived west of Kayamkulam")
Annex 2 – passage No 2 (Route)
In this passage Mr. Freddy declares that at the time of the accident, the St. Antony was sailing toward south.
Annex 2 – passage No 4 (Distance from Needakara)
The position of the two boats at the same instantData as precise as improbable, those provided to the Police by Freddy, that at 4:30 PM ist places himself at a point far from the position where the incident of the Enrica Lexie is taking place; with course and speed that got him away from the Italian ship without any chance to cross it.
Proceeding south he would never have "approached" the Enrica Lexie, who proceeded to 330° (as confirmed by the alarm SSAS that detects it automatically), but he would have constantly moved away.
We will return in more detail on this aspect by discussing the ANNEX 48.
In other statements made to the press he will put himself in front of Alappuzha (17/2/2012), Chertala (3/3/2012), Kollam (21/3/2012). Never these positions never coincide with that of Lexie at 4:30 PMist, always distant tens of Km.
The different positions of St.Anthony in Freddy's interviews to Indian and Italian newspapers
Please note that although on board the vessel there is a GPS device, strangely the acts show that never, in any occasion Freddy has indicated the crash site providing geographic coordinates to the police, the media and the judiciary.
Mr. Freddy Bosco is unreliable, his statements have no value in court and should not even enter.
Either you start to shoot from 120 mt., according to the Indian version (ANNEX 48) or from 450 mt. as reported in the Italian one (the 500 yards of the Latorre report): the firing of a weapon in cal. 5.56, as those supplied to our military in no case may be perceived in open sea as "a huge noise." The causes of the huge noise will be sought, as we will do later, exploring other hypotheses.
And if this perceptive discrepancy doesn’t convince you, here's now another one, this time objective:
ANNEX 2 - passage No.5 (THE 'SOUND' OF THE FIRING)In the FIR signed a few minutes later, Freddy's "huge noise" disappears, giving place to a more ambiguous "sound" a second significant discrepancy between the two versions.
Annex 2 - passage No 6 (The firing mode)Mr. Bosco declares that the fire against the St. Antony continued for about 2 minutes," and that "The bullets were falling on us like a torrential rain".
Sure cartridges on board
were not lacking, the indian Police seized more than nine
thousand of them (more in ANNEX 5); each marine was carrying
a loaded firearm and six other shippers from 30 shots; the
assault rifle Beretta SC 70/90' has a rate of fire of 670
strokes per minute; under these conditions it could
certainly pour in two minutes 420 shots at their disposal:
"as a torrential rain" in the Indian Ocean.
In the reality of the facts, as reported by the same indians (ANNEX 5), about 20 shots were fired, 12 by Latorre and 8 with another rifle (presumably Girone).
Including at least 6 of those exploded during the first two bursts of warning (given by way of prudential a 'burst' consists of a minimum of three strokes) which, according to the Latorre's report were fired into the water when the unknown boat was at 500 and 300 yards (a fact that is confirmed in the interview Noviello - Radio Capital by the only Italian officer on the bridge, an eyewitness of the facts and of whose testimony among the Indian cards there is no trace).
To shoot the remaining 14 rounds (maybe less) would have been enough a burst during less than a couple of seconds, but we have to exclude that things have gone as well, according to the story of the same Freddy Bosco.
It remains to understand how 14 rounds (maybe less) exploded in 2 minutes (on average one every 7-10 seconds) can give make the idea of a torrential rain of blows.
Perception and cadence of
shot: something is not making sense.
Then we have that first single shot that, according to Bosco 'opens up' the shooting, reaching the helmsman head.
With an assault rifle in cal. 5.56 from over 100
meters between sailing boats (relatively stable the tanker,
much less the fishing boat), regardless of the use or
non-use of optical system, it would be, for reasons of
ballistic instability, an impossible shot, as said by people
much more competent than me, and, among others, for the
evidence we have, really in contrast to the "deterrent
fire", those 'bursts' that our military claim to have
exploded in the accident early stage and that no testimony
Accuracy and firing modes: something does not come back.
And when the discrepancies
and omissions of factors such as: perception, rate of fire,
precision, and mode of a shootout offer so many and such
grounds of doubt, the only certainty that gives us the
testimony of Freddy is the story of another film,' nothing
like they have witnessed on board the Italian ship.
We know several details of the boat that approached the tanker with optimal conditions of light and visibility, some of which supported by multiple sources, limiting the discussion to these and ignoring all the others we can say that:
1. it comes under the
tanker from " starboard bow", that is, comes to meet the
front, slightly on the right, and farther aft, or from the
back side of the ship;
Graphic reconstruction: The Lexie view from the boat
2. while approaching, “at least” two people observed it with the binoculars: Noviello and Girone (in the other depositions while providing details which are hardly visible to the naked eye from 200 meters. there is no mention ever in binoculars);
Graphic reconstruction: The St.Anthony seen by Lexie3. A few people standing can be seen on board (irrelevant now if they were armed or not).
We know one thing about the big ship approaching the St. Antony - the video of Venad News (see: paragraph 'The Time of the incident') and the FIR (ANNEX 2) agree on that -: it was red below and black above. Nothing else. According to statements made by the survivors, the crew was sleeping on deck except the man at the helm but he will also be the first to be shot to death.
Given as true all of these conditions, it seems very strange that:
- no one from the tanker identifies by name (visible) the boat approaching but will just describe it from its color (and does not indicate 'white'); they can see on board several crew members who definitely are not sleeping.
- from the fishing boat, they can’t see the ship name while approaching or leaving.
Although admitting they are sleeping during the first phase, we know from ANNEX 2 that, certainly, the survivors are awake in the second. As to say after the shootings, escaping the immediate danger, none of the nine looks in the direction of the ship and reads the name that hangs on the transom.
Not only the two versions do not match between them at some point, but we are asked to accept things that we don't consider normal or credible.
From my notes:
On the 29th of November 2012, more than nine months after the accident, on the site BLOOMBERG is published, a long analysis of Alan Katz, with the title, Brother Shot Dead Fishing Tests Armed Guards'Accountability. is published
After the usual story of how the accident took place, and to clarify once and for all the Italian responsibility, Mr.Freddy finally reveals to the Americans and to the world something of the story until that moment unpublished:
“Standing to take the wheel and turn the boat away from the merchant ship, Freddy glanced at the stern of the black-and-red tanker as it passed a bit more than a football-field's length away. “NAPLES,” he read, the home port of the " Enrica Lexie.”
Mr.Freddy Bosco here provides an indication of overwhelming guilt:
"Watching it getting away, he was unfortunately not able to read the name of the ship, but he managed to read NAPOLI" ... and this isn’t easy to do at all. Try it, with the help of the image.
For the umpteenth time Mr. Freddy proves to be one of the most unreliable and disqualified witnesses of the planet, keep in mind that by his words and by statements such as this, depends a political-diplomatic crisis between States involving about one billion and four hundred million of people. Unbelievable.
After the shooting, conducted boat and crew in a safe place, discovered the death of two comrades, Freddy just has to raise the alarm and call for help. He could contact the Coast Guard using the on-board radio, on the emergency frequency (Channel 16) or using his mobile phone, contact the police by calling 100 (the equivalent in Kerala of Italian 112).
Freddy called Prabhu.
ANNEX 2 – Passage No 7 (FREDDY LAUNCHES ALARM)
This is a big news: in the acts of the various criminal and civil cases held in Kollam, Trivandrum and Delhi or when the 27.04.2012 it was reached an out of court agreement (Lok Adalath) and receives a cheque from the
Italian shipowner, Freddy always appears as the "owner" (see: High Court
of Kerala CMCP No. 16 of 2012 and other), instead
in ANNEX 2, he declares to the
Police that the owner of the St. Antony is Prabhu.
At this point it would be useful to understand who is actually the owner of St. Antony, not so much to understand to whom Freddy lied, if the courts or the police, but because if Prabhu turned out as the real owner of St.Antony, this also would change the legal framework concerning its release from seizure and subsequent sinking.
The lack of custody of the exhibit from the Court,
allowed the sinking, therefore the inability for the
technicians of the defense to perform feedback, checks and inspections. so far we have been led to
believe that the "St. Anthony",
for decision of the Court of Kollam, had been returned to
Bosco because "his only source of income" and from him then
left to sink.
But if it had been returned to Prabhu, the rightful owner who rents to fishermen, what interest could he ever he have to sink it, depriving himself of a good property and a source of income? Then, should we necessarily assume that Prabhu was aware of the need to cancel the traces of the shooting.
Then was it Prabhu
who contacted the Police giving alarm? No!
From Annex 3 – Chargesheet: As the news of the accident comes to the Police #1
According to the chargesheet, the indictment drawn up by the Police Neendakara at the conclusion of the preliminary investigation (ANNEX 3), it was CW-12 to contact CW-57. Or by replacing the names to the numbers: it was Alphonse Philip (CW-12) around 17:30 who informed the SI (sub-inspector) G. Shaji (CW-57) of the Police of Neendakara by providing cryptic information. And it was not Prabhu to inform Alphonse Philip, but Aloysious.
In short here is the entire phone chain as it is rebuilt by the police in ANNEX 3 (Freddy is CW-1).
From Annex 3 – Chargesheet: As the news of the accident comes to the Police #2
So it's not Bosco to inform the police or the Coast Guard, but someone else who provides 'fourth hand' information, not for nothing defined cryptic by the same Police.
As the news of the accident comes to the Police #3
The latter without making any check, turns the information directly to the Coast Guard (17: 40ist) and the Kochi Navy, starting the chain of events described in ANNEX 1.
At this point, to understand if in the minutes
following the accident the mobile phones on board of the St.
Anthony worked, is an aspect that is anything but secondary.
In a group interview released by the "survivors" two days after the facts, on the 17th of February to The Hindu newspaper, the fishermen (despite the evidence now finally clearly established) claimed (incorrectly, lying, or, worse, telling the truth) that the accident had occurred at about 14 Nm from the coast (which they consider to be their territorial waters, should be to understand why), well away from the place where the accident at Lexie occurs 20,5 Nm off the coast.
In support of their argument they bring solid evidence:
the fact that their mobile phones were working, proves it.
Note how in this interview, the same journalist, while charging the death of the two fishermen at the Enrica Lexie (from the morning of the previous day the Coast Guard was spreading this version of events), indicates that the accident occurred in the evening, maybe having news of the statements of Bosco made at the time of the landing at Neendakara.
In addition, Mr. Freddy says that the ship "aggressor" was inshore (that is moved to East, even more close to the coasts of Kerala) off the route normally used for the transit of commercial ships. From these statements it is even more evident that the St. Antony cannot cross the Enrica Lexie at 4:30 PM 20.5 NM from the coast.
Apparently inexplicable is the reason why:
after the shooting, Mr. Bosco, rather than to the Authority, raises the alarm by calling, with the VHF, Prabhu, the owner of the fishing boat (see ANNEX 2);
after being informed of the incident at the fishing boat, Prabhu doesn’t raise directly the alarm but calls Aloysious, who calls Alphonse Philip, who finally relates everything to G. Shaji, S. I. (Sub Ispector) at Coastal Police Station, Neendakara (see ANNEX 3);
after the shooting, with two dead people on the boat, the on-board radio operating and operating mobile phone, after having talked with Prabhu and during the 5-6 hours of navigation needed to get back to Neendakara, no one, neither Freddy nor any other member of the crew, contacts the Police or the Coast Guard to provide indications, receive information or instructions, etc.;
received “summary” information (17:30 ist) the
Police raises the alarm to the ICG and the Navy in Kochi
(17:40 ist). During the entire search and in spite of knowing that the boat was hit, and
could be in trouble, no Authorities tries to get in contact
with the fishing boat (act don't report any communication) in order to obtain clarifications useful for the
tracing the responsible, the conditions of the vessel, the
location, etc. - No one goes to meet the boat to provide
The means by which CPS, Neendakara could provide
relief to St. Anthony in return
No one seems to be interested in the St. Anthony and its nine survivors until the return at Neendakara, shortly before 23:00ist, waiting on the pier the police and a few hundred friends, onlookers and journalists.
And again I find myself having to detect a strange coincidence:
When Alphonse Philip at 17:30 ist, contacts Neendakara Coastal Police Station, finally launching the alarm, to pick it up is G. Shaji SI (Sub-Inspector).
When around 22:30 ist Freddy lands from the fishing boat at Neendakara and releases his “hot” statement (see: Video Venad NEWS - paragraph 'The incident Hours'), the Police officer always present during the statements of Bosco while claiming he was shot at 21:30 ist is still a 'sub-inspector'.
Frame of the video Venad News from which you can determine the military grade of the policeman with Freddy
We have to assume that it is the same person: the one informed by Alphonse Philip at 17:40 (CW-57 of ANNEX 3) and the one that goes to the dock at 23 ist about to welcome the St. Antony; the one who attends the testimony given to the media by Freddy Bosco and hear him saying and reaffirming that the shooting occurred at 21:30 ; the same that shortly after, on the premises of the Police Station, listens to him while declaring that the St. Antony got shot at 16:30 .
It is the same police to
write that the information is made in a "cryptic" way by the
fourth person bouncing on the phone the news about the
accident, but this does not prevent them from granting him
the maximum confidence and giving immediate feedback to
information. Immediately retransmitted to the ICG in the
form of 'research note' without any verification.
But when a few hours later the same police has the opportunity to hear from the voice of the person directly involved, the eye witness made for the first time, just back to the ground, when not being aware of other facts (the accident at Lexie) provided by his point of view the 'authentic' recostruction of the facts to the media, this is totally ignored, and the Police reports never mention the contradictions on the time of the shooting.
Here we want to argue that the Bosco statements are
actually without any feedback that is verifiable, an
inextricable "black hole".
It does not hold, all contrasts with everything from both the logical and the factual point of wiew.
A) Contradiction - Bosco statements to the authorities are in contradiction with what he says to witnesses, media and authorities (the police officer) when in port;
B) Failure - The authorities fail to record the contradictory statements by Bosco, even though they are well aware;
C) Contradiction - The geographical location of St. Antony at the time of the shots, as indicated by Bosco in his statement to the police puts it, as is easily verified, a lot SOUTH and in the opposite direction to the Enrica Lexie position at the time of the shooting. It is useful to remember that in later statements made to the media, Bosco will give at least three other positions, all of which are incompatible with the Lexie tens of km;
D) Contradiction - the Bosco statements to the authorities about the shooting are in contradiction with the later results of investigation. Distances, time, accuracy, methods and perceptions about the shooting remain free of feedback;
E) Logical vulnus - Free of plausible explanations for optimal lighting and visibility conditions, the mutual lack of identification between the boats in the stages preceding and following the incident;
F) Logical vulnus - If it were true that the St. Antony was shot at 16:30 (4:30 PM Indian time), none of the fishermen in five hours called the authorities, despite "phones that were taking" and the onboard radio (VHS ) functioning. Only Bosco called Prabhu who now we find to be the "Owner of the St. Antony's Boat". It's absurd that after the attack with two deaths on board, no one from St. Antony warns the authorities directly.
G) Logical vulnus - If it were true that the St. Antony was shot at 16:30 (4:30 PM Indian time) and Bosco warns Prabhu who warns not the authorities but some Aloysious who in turn warns a certain Alphonse Philip who finally alerts the authorities at 17:40, but in a "cryptic" way as indicated by the Police.
H) Logical vulnus - From the statements it turns out that the owner of the St. Antony is Prabhu, and then the fishing boat St. Antony after the seizure is necessarily returned to him, it’s not clear his interest in sinking the St. Antony is not clear, if not to erase the traces of the shooting, making him an active subject of the story and not just a "rent boats".
As in the specific episode of the distress call, when the victim doesn’t make a choice of common sense and the authorities accept the intermediation in informing the criminal act, leaving enter the story, as actors, three subjects (Prabhu, Aloysius and Philip Alphonse) whose role is unknown and that manage in the first person, and we do not know how, the information about what happened. Without even feeling the need to give explicit mention in the Chargesheet (ANNEX 3).
Mr. Bosco is once again unreliable, the behaviour of the Police inexplicably superficial, the investigation once again clearly prejudicial and omissive.
Comments to Annexe 4 – Post-mortem Report
Post-mortem report of Mr Ajeesh and Mr Valentine, 16 February 2012
With the release of the Indian documents, from the
safe where they had been held since
the beginning, what has surely received greater prominence in the Italian press
were the autopsies, for the obvious reason that they provided objective data that was easily understandable: the size of a bullet.
This analysis obviously lacks the skills to question any forensic aspect (no professional in this field questioned so far wanted to comment this document) so we shall limit the analysis to
the measurements of the two bullets found, the first in the body of elder fisherman Valentine and the second in young Pinku.
ANNEX 4: Le misure del proiettile #1
The size of the bullet found cannot be disputed; its calibre and length are 7.62x31mm
Le misure del proiettile refertato (sopra) - (immagini esemplificative NON raffigurano il reperto originale)
it is not a bullet issued to the Italian team, it has nothing to do with the weapons seized on the Lexie, and it is not even standard Western equipment.
Tavola comparativa: La lunghezza di alcuni tipi di proiettili. A destra quelli in uso sulla Lexie (cal. 5.56)
This is a Russian manufactured bullet, even designed in the late 1800’s, which underwent further evolution and can be attributed to cartridge 7.62x54R. This round can be fired by firearms indeed widespread, either used by regular armed forces or illegally or even by pirates.
Videos and images document this:
For example in India weapons suitable for this cartridge are known to be manufactured by the state factory "Ordnance Factory Tiruchirappalli".
We do not wish to speculate that this bullet was
fired by a weapon of the Indian, Sri Lankan or any other
Our aim is to show that this bullet could not be fired by weapons issued to the Italian military escort team
protecting MV Enrica Lexie as all these had a 5.56mm calibre.
In this case the size of the bullet is different:
ANNEX 4: The bullet measure #2
We are faced with a compressed bullet, deformed after impacting against very strong bone, as confirmed by the following passage:
ANNEX 4: Ajees Pinku Post-Mortem #1
The penetration wound size, due to bullet entrance, is incompatible with the entry hole of a calibre 5.56mm bullet:
- Lacerated penetrating wound of entrance 2.7x1.6 cm (27x16mm)
Both bullets have
a size differing from those that can be fired by the
weapons supplied to the Italian military.
In the first case (Jelestine) it is evident to the naked eye.
Since the autopsies were carried
out after the incident on 16th February, this means that the two Italian
military should not have even been arrested, when a simple
check on the calibre of the weapons available on the ship
would have been enough to clear them.
But the autopsies were not disclosed and on
17.02.2012 Ms N.G. Nisha, from the Forensic
Science Laboratory, carries out an inspection on the St Antony fishing boat, recovers the fragments of two bullets, decides with a naked eye (by estimating hundredths of a millimetre with a tape measure) that these fragments have a 5.56mm calibre.
(See document Annex8)
The two Italian military on 19.02.2012 were not acquitted but arrested merely on this basis.
Inspection on board of the St.Antony (Venad News video)
We will find these two bullet
fragments also in the Ballistic Expert Report
of Annex 7, signed
by the same Ms N.G. Nisha, where she states “It is not possible to opine” whether these fragments
came from the rifles seized and had a 5.56mm calibre.
- “It is not possible to opine whether the fragmented jacket piece is discharged
through any of the firearms or spare barrels involved in this case or not”.
da ANNEX 7: the uncertain conclusion of the
In fact, as may be read
in the Ballistic Expert Report, the fragments of one
bullet weigh 0.8 grams and those of the other bullet
weigh between 0.4 and 0.1 grams.
It is not clear how on 17.02.2012 Ms N.G. Nisha may conclude that the calibre was 5.56mm, by even assessing that with a tape measure as shown by videos.
Again it should be noted that from the start the aim of the investigation was to nail the Italian military by creating documents, apparently technical in nature, but with unfounded conclusions.
The document which would have immediately cleared the Italian military Italian, the post-mortem reports of Annex 4, was never disclosed.
We have it now only because of the judicial
transparency of the ITLOS in Hamburg.
(Translator: Mario Ricci)
Position of the St.Antony and the MV Enrica Lexie at the moment of the shootingIn this annex, the positions of the two ships at the moment of shooting are shown through a design which describes them in details.
The design appears in this document as realized in CAD* 2D (but printed on paper and then produced in hardcopy) (CAD - Computer Aided Design, electronic vector design aided by computer)
(*) CAD - Computer Aided Design.
Draw from Annex nr. 48
The design is entitled “SCENE OF CRIME” and includes the wind rose in order to enable us to evaluate the respective directions.
St. Antony toward South
Enrica Lexie toward North-West (N-W)
A range of 120m from the shooting point (the Enrica Lexie’s starboard bridge wing)
ANNEX A3: Automatic message from SSAS to the Lexie
(See Annex 2): "Hence, we switched to the southern direction.."
- Fishermen’s declaration during an interview at the Hindu on 17th February 2012: "Then they decided to go to another place some 40 nautical miles south”.
ANNEX 48: elaboration draw n. 1
Through the wind rose, it is possible to evaluate St. Antony direction, with a very good approximation, at 186° (straight on South it would be 180°. St. Antony in this design sails slightly toward S-W (South – West).
Through the circle sector showing the measurement of distance from the fire point (120 meters), it is possible to evaluate with adequate approximation the distance of St. Anthony from the fire point (100 meters) as well.
It is also interesting the estimate of the extent of impact angle of the bullets in relation to the longitudinal axis of the St. Anthony: 30 °, 37 approximately. In the design, bullets hit the St. Anthony on the starboard (right) where it is possible to see these damages both in videos and in photographs.
There are not any doubts on the fact that St. Antony has been hit on right side, as the designs “SCENE OF CRIME” also shows.The purpose of this analysis is to verify, through the design “Scene of crime” in Annex 48 - the compatibility of Bosco’s declaration with what survived fishermen stated later, as well as to verify that the affirmed “South direction” is compatible with damages objectively verifiable on St. Anthony.
Italians witnesses (Latorre, Vitelli) are univocal in affirming that the ship, then involved in the incident, was recorded by radar being “starboard prow” as to the Lexie (Latorre) and heading to the "starboard beam" (the centre of ship right side) (Vitelli).
(See the document “kinematic analysis” (only in Italian) at the link: http://www.seeninside.net/piracy/esposto6.pdf )
ANNEX 48: Kinematic analysis
By the kinematic reconstruction, it is evident that:
- even by positioning the approaching ship on the left side with respect to what is considered the band of “starboard prow” at a speed of 8 knots (kts) and following a direction toward 186°, it cannot arrive alongside Enrica Lexie.
- The two ships would cross at a minimum distance of about 900 meters, while the various witnesses and the design in Annex 48 indicate 50 meters from the right side of Enrica Lexie.
- The angle between the two ships routes is obviously 36°.
ANNEX 48: Animation
of kinematic analysis
The angle between the routes is at 16° approximately; completely wrong if considered that it should be 36°.
The angle of Enrica Lexie route as to the North is indicated in approximately 10°, completely different than 30° it should be (obviously, the Lexie was headed to 330 °; to 360 ° (North) there are 30°left)
ANNEX 48: Elaboration draw n. 2
The design in the Annex 48 is completely wrong and cannot represent the “Scene of crime” as they boasted of in order to prove the “Italian guilty” to inexperienced and / or unprepared people.
ANNEX 48: Verification 1In the CAD 3D design St. Anthony is:
- At 100 meters from the fire point, as indicated in the design “scene of crime”
- At 50 meters from the Lexie right side as indicated by various witnesses and by the design “Scene of crime”
- Following a route of 186° as indicated in
the design “Scene of crime ".
ANNEX 48: Zoom of the verification 1Enlarging the scene, it is evident that, using the right angles, the St. Antony shows the left side at the fire point, while shots of bullets are on its right side.
Looking at the scene from above, it is evident that shots would come from the left side, which means the opposite side if compared to what the design “Scene of crime” indicates and both videos and photographs show.
ANNEX 48: Verification 2
Design "Scene of crime" in Annex 48 entitled “Position of the St. Antony and the MV Enrica Lexie at the moment of shooting” is manifestly wrong and consequently misleading in what it peremptorily states: the "scene of crime".
People with a little experience or different professional know how (e.g. journalists, lawyers or judges) may have believed that this “scene of crime” could be realistic.
ANNEX 48: Verification 3: by overlying the
artifice is obvious
undersigned believes that the drafter of the design had
merely indicated the direction of the shots detectable
on the right side of the vessel in accordance with the
alleged fire point, without even searching any evidence
in the witnesses, in widely known data and in consequent
ANNEX 48: Riscontro 4
ANNEX 48: Particolare da Riscontro 4
ANNEX 48: Riscontro 1, evidenziata la 'linea di tiro'
However, the undersigned had already reached – through the May 2013 CAD-3D “Analysis of positions” - the conclusion that, if the St. Anthony was on southern route, it could only expose the left side to the fire point, while shots hit the ship on the right side.
See document at: http://www.seeninside.net/piracy/esposto4.pdf
According to Italian witnesses (Latorre and Vitelli), St. Anthony could not approach the Enrica Lexie at less than 700 meters approximately, and in any case it would have always shown the left side, not the right one. See document at: http://www.seeninside.net/piracy/esposto6.pdf
analysing the alleged “Scene of crime” proposed by
Indian authorities to the Court of Hamburg, the
conclusion is always the same:
- shots that hit St. Anthony did not come from Enrica Lexie.
In this document will be made an analysis of the document “ANNEX 5” attached to the Indian documents deposited at the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea of Hamburg on 6 August 2015.
Search list for weapons, 26 February 2012
The document is a list of the material recovered and in part seized on Enrica Lexie during the inspection of 25/2/2012, in the presence of Italian delegates.
It treats of arms (rifles, machine guns, pistols), ammunitions, bulletproof vest.
The material was recovered in two ship’s cabins (n. 405 and n. 329).
In cabin n. 329 are kept 15 ammunition boxes in a cupboard.
In a box 820 pistol cartridges of 9 mm and in the box n. 22 250 rounds of 7.62 mm. (e.n.: 1070 total rounds)
In a 13 boxes list (from n. 9 to n. 21) are kept in sum 7.520 rounds of 5.56 mm.
From box n. 16 are taken 26 ordinary bullets (e.n.: 5.56 mm) and from box n. 19 are taken 24 tracer bullets (e.n.: 5.56 mm).
ANNEX 5: The materials founded in Cabin n. 329
On the date 16/2 the cabin 405 was sealed from ship’s captain, then on 22/2 by customs officials.
It was opened again on 25/2 at the presence of Indian officials and Italian representatives. All the material was photographed and filmed, then were written the lists both of the seized materials and of the non seized.
Page 4, III paragraph:
“the articles which are non seized in the cabin were listed in separate inventory” – In this cabin 2 boxes of ammunition having 200 rounds each of 5.56 mm. Another box contain 250 rounds of 7.62 mm.
List of articles seized during search conducted in Enrica Lexie
See pages 6 and 7;
ANNEX 5: Materials seized from cabin n. 405
List of articles inside cabin n. 405 (e.n.: not seized)
See page 8
"The search of the two cabins was
completed. Another search list is preparated. The entire area
of the ship will be verified with help of customs official and
it will noted on the mahassar. The search ends at 12 night"
As it is possible to verify from the whole document at each discovered weapon (seized or not seized) on the included spare barrels is indicated the registration number.
At page 9 we can easily suppose that six weapons in list are semiautomatic pistols Beretta 92FS that have a loader able to 15 cartridges. So each pistol has been discovered with inserted a loader complete of cartridges and a reserve loader complete of cartridges.
Pistols of 9mm in equipment of single military and the relative cartridges (both those founded in cabin 329, both those in the loader) have not been judged of interest for the investigation and so not seized.
Because cartridges 7.62mm were found in both cabins and in the same list are indicated “Machine Gun 7.62 1 NO”, “Spare barrel for MG 1 NO” and “MG ammunition box 1 having 250 rounds” it will be interesting to study moore deeply the issue that lends to an intellectual disagreement.
The document in question while having in the title the date of 26 February, in reality it refers to an inspection carried out on 25 February, started at 1:15 PM (local time 13:15) and completed at 12:00 PM (24:00).
In the “Ballistic Report” (ANNEX 7) is indicated the time of the seizure of various materials, starting from 04:00 PM to 10:00 PM, of the same day 25/2/2012;
(page numbering as indicated in the original document, by hand in the upper right)
We also must note that:
The lists of the seized materials report at the page end names and signatures of witnesses, Indians and Italians   ;
For the apposition of the signatures we realized a graphic scheme with the names’ list written at left and the signatures in the right (   in lightblue);
All the seized materials has been seized on 25/2/2012;
The declaration written by the Italian Consul Cutillo () related to observation and reserves in date 25/2/2012;
As well as all must be affixed, obviously, in every page of the seizure report, from first to last one.
It’s usual practice, doesn’t exist a judiciary
document that records an act in contradictory that isn’t
signed on all the pages by entitleds people does not exist.
It is to avoid following hypothetical manipulations. For this purpose in judiciary documents there can’t be even corrections, erasures or abrasions.
But this doesn’t happen for the other document’ pages (see page 5) that besides to not carrying any signature, it apparently lets the document start from page 5.
This absence of signatures by the people entitled, moreover presents signatures on the page where is listed the seized material, make the “Search list for weapons, 26 February 2012” document juridically void, unusable in trial proceedings.
evident, on the first page are absent signatures not only of
the Italian witnesses, but also those of Indian witnesses are
There isn’t the presents identification (who is you? Napoleon, and you? Julius Caesar…the madame instead is Lucrezia Borgia’s sister). Missing even pages’ number when in judiciary documents is written “page x of xx”.In conclusion, the undersigned doesn’t want to practice the art of legal technicality, but it’s obvious that this document should be rejected in any Court, and whatever lawyer can confirm it.
We do not want to sustain that all is “false”, we want to sustain that it “could” be formed in order to represent a reality different from the truth. And because in this event the “could” takes too often the place of “is” and then the “could” inexplicably passes for “true” is correct study in deep as possible.
page 5 (or
1, it’s misunderstandable which number has to prevail
one printed in upper centre or the one written at end
in upper right)
of the document it is read that:
Following at page 6 (or 2):
In cabin 329 with the other cartridges (all 5.56mm) was found a second box (n. 22) with 250 rounds of 7.62mm. But in the following list of 13 boxes the box n. 22 is missing.
At least at page 9 (written in hand in upper right) we found:
List of articles inside cabin n. 405 (e.n.: not seized)
At item from 1 to 6 we have regulation pistols (Beretta 92FS have 15 rounds loader), then other material and, of particular interest:
Machine Gun 7.62 – 1 NO
Spare barrel for MG – 1 NO
MG ammunition box – 1 having 250 rounds
There is all for the perfect machine gunners!
If indeed it were weapons and spare barrels the registration number would be indicated as for all the other weapons found, loader or spare barrels, as they were seized (rifles, loader, etc…) as not seized (guns).
It’s clear that all the things of interest for investigation were seized. Pistols and cartridges weren’t seized because they weren’t interesting for investigation.
It’s obvious that finding a Machine Gun, its spare barrel and its ammunitions all 7.62mm this material would be interesting for investigation and so seized.
There is no trace either of Machine Gun, or
of spare barrel or of cartridge of 7.62mm.
Essentially, even the Beretta rifles and Herstal
machine gun all of 5.56mm the Indian investigators found
another possible murder weapon of 7.62mm and they ignored it.
Then we observe page 9 of the document (e.n.: the one in which appears the “Machine Gun 7.62”).
As it appears, drafted without date, numbered in sequence with the others or preceed and subceed by pages dated 25/2 (page 10 is the seal (put by Indian functionaries at Cabin 405 on 22/2) and removed on 25/2) seems to also be part of the lists drafted during inspection happened in the presence of Italian witness that as read at page 6 (or 2) ends at 24:00.
after, in the heart of the night and enlightened by lights,
had take place the transfer to land of boxes with seized
material. Boxes sealed and countersigned by presents
If it was not that three diligent Indian officials signed it and added with their own hand the date [A] highlightened so that the formation of list at page 9 did not happened in the occasion of the inspection but the following day 26/2. Drafting by Indian examining in wonderful solitude.
It jumps besides to the eyes the lack of the appropriate box for the signatures used the day before and opportunely present in the previous pages. [B]
The signatures are appended below the list with a random order. Lacking all Italian signatures except one, that probably appended at last. [A]
Then, maybe to permit the identification, “someone” (surely not appended the signature) add “somewhat” at hand, like “stamp” but made a terrible mistake.
The “signature” in fact would be that of Rub Captain Francesco Marino (M.A.V.M. – Training responsible of the amphibious component of Italian Navy and future Ordered Deputy of San Marco Regiment) that we have already seen as last Italian signatory in the box used to certify some pages on 25/2; [C]
But the “someone” who added “somewhat” makes a mistake and instead of the right name puts that of “Jean Paul PIERINI” which was already indicated as “Commander” at page 5 (or 1, the one without signatures).
In reality Pierini, who doesn’t sign the seizure’s record, is the legal consultant of Italian Navy, as it is possible to easily verify from his curriculum which is on net (source: Linkedin).
Jean Paul Pierini:
Legal Adviser CINCNAV – Rome (e.n.: Command in Head of the Naval Squad)
Italian MOD – Navy (e.n.: Department of Defense – Navy)
November 2008-September 2012 (3 years 11 months).
If that is his signature it’s enough to ask him for it.
It’s well to remember some news that appeared on Indian press about the weapons used in the Enrica Lexie’s event, news critically retaken by Italian press seeing that Indian authorities somewhere along the line came back on Lexie to search other weapons:
25 February 2012
Weapons’ seizure – is the present document (ANNEX 5)
At the end of a search on board of Enrica Lexie the police unload four material’s boxes. Guns and assault rifles Beretta, machine guns Minimì, thousands of ammunitions, and other equipments. The whole arsenal of Italian military team ends up in hand of Kerala’s police. It will be transferred to Delhi only after the pronunciation of the Supreme Court (18 January 2013) which rules the lack of jurisdiction of the State of Kerala on the case.
4 March 2012
The caliber of the bullets reported out during autopsy does not correspond (ANNEX4)
The press, reported Prof. K. Sasikala’s declaration, who had made the autopsy on two victims describes the bullets pull out of the bodies. Sizes incompatibles with bullets used by Italian soldiers, possibly a Russian bullet of 7.62x54R.
4 April 2012
Ballistic Expert Record No B1-1001/FSL/2012, 4 April 2012 (ANNEX 7)
All the seized weapons are of 5.56mm. The “Ballistic Report” concludes that the shots which have killed the two victims have been fired from two of the six seized rifles, both Beretta SC 70/90 of 5.56mm.
4 April 2012
The examiners return on board of Enrica Lexie to search the missing weaponshttp://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2012-04-04/inquirenti-indiani-brancolano-buio
The same day 4 April the Indian examiners return on Lexie to search a weapon that it would not be found, retracting the conclusions of the ballistic report which identify two of the weapons already seized on 25 February.http://archivio.panorama.it/news/esteri/War-Games/Indiani-senza-prove-contro-i-maro-ora-cercano-un-arma-fantasma
Times of India opinion, the investigators “suspects that
one of the weapon at disposal to the soldiers must be
still seized” – “the weapon used by one
of the Italian Marines is not between those seized on
board of the ship”. It
also appears that some days earlier, 30
March 2012, the police returned on
board of the ship, to interrogate the other four Italian
Marines who remained on board. In particular to the other
four Italian Marines were asked details about the
registration number and description of the weapons
10 April 2012
Compatibility of the riflings
The responsible of ballistic investigation declares the “compatibility of the riflings” between the bullets reported out in the bodies and those fired from seized rifles. It denies the denial.
11 April 2012
Italian Marines to arrests, Indian experts get the wrong rifle. “Were not Arx-160 on board of Enrica Lexie”
Indian authorities declares that the rifles shoot at fishermen are Beretta ARX 160. It deals of a sperimental rifle not yet in service, it denies again the Ballistic Report which had identified the seized rifle Beretta SC 70/90.
14 April 2012
The Ballistic Report on Italian media
On Italian TV was seen the Ballistic Report showing practically in unified networks that the document represents the “proof” of guilty of the two accused. The document as possibly seen appears heavily manipulated.
11 May 2012
Found the weapons that had fired, but they are the wrong ones
Admiral Alessandro Piroli at the end of a summary investigation redacts a report in which are reported the conclusions reached by Indian Autorities. Is highly probably that to kill were Italian rifle, but not those of Latorre and Girone but those of other two riflemen.
So there was just a lot of confusion.
This document “Search list for weapons, 26 February 2012” obviously has no legal significance. If it was presented at Court it would be rejected because of the lack of signatures on all pages, identification of the defendants etc.
Furthermore the drafters should be called to explain the question of the appended signatures on the part of the document developed on 26/2.
As for “Machine Gun 7.62” some imaginative journalist can mount a piece of color in accusatory viewpoint (Maybe, at the bottom of Indian Ocean, there is the proof that n nails down their responsibilities…).
We say that the formation of this document lends itself, as usual, to free the imagination of inexperienced readers who could form a kind of fictional reality.
Remains the fact that on this document there are false signatures, less that believe that that is the signature of the Legal Consultant of Italian Navy.
In the merit of specific matter have demonstrated on its whole evidence the alteration of the document occurs at a time following the one of the signature is not a mere matter of form, but of method. It will be the duty of the Court to carefully evaluate to understand if and how much this method was used by Indian Autorities in drowning up also all the other documents.
And the presence of the Machine Gun is not proven with false signatures.
The indian delegation at the ITLOS
Il lavoro di analisi dimostra l'innocenza di
due cittadini italiani. Puo' essere confutato, discusso
vivisezionato e ritenuto poco credibile, anche se abbiamo
studiato a lungo la cosa e siamo in grado di ribattere. Ma il
silenzio si spiega anche con il fastidio di tanta parte
dell'informazione verso chi ha fatto il lavoro che sarebbe stato
compito di un giornalismo rigoroso e senza pregiudizi...
Ma e' una battaglia, la nostra, che continua. Vi chiedo di aiutarci a diffonderla. Comunque vada, non molliamo.
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